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On 13 June 2025, the High Court to the UK government’s decision to apply Value Added Tax (VAT) to private school fees. On 27 February 2026, the Court of Appeal . The claimants, including Christian and Charedi Jewish families and schools, argued that the policy breached their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. They relied on Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights, together with Article 2 of Protocol 1 (A2P1), which protects parents’ right to ensure that their children’s education respects their religious or philosophical convictions. They maintained that removing the VAT exemption would disproportionately affect families seeking faith-based education and could unfairly threaten the viability of smaller religious schools.

The courts resoundingly rejected the claim. While acknowledging that the policy may have significant financial consequences for some families and institutions, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal held that this does not amount to unlawful discrimination or a breach of parental rights under the Convention. The VAT measure applies to all private schools, regardless of ethos. It does not prohibit the establishment or operation of religious schools, nor does it prevent parents from choosing faith-based education, whether privately, in state-funded schools or at home. At the heart of the case is a simple point: A2P1 protects families against the state educating children in ways that conflict with parents’ convictions. It does not require the state to subsidise religious schooling in whatever form parents prefer. Financial strain does not, in itself, render a general tax measure incompatible with A2P1 or Article 14, even if it does lead to school closures.

‘Financial strain does not, in itself, render a general tax measure incompatible with Article 2 or Article 14, even if it does lead to school closures.’

The courts’ reasoning points beyond the immediate VAT dispute to deeper questions about how parental rights, children’s interests and wider public goods should be balanced in education policy. In our recent book, How to Think ºÚÁÏÍø911 Religious Schools: Principles and Policies, my co-authors and I argue that any right that parents might claim to pass on their beliefs cannot be absolute (see Clayton et al., 2024). The state has additional responsibilities both to children and to the wider public. Education serves not only individual or family-centred aims – such as transmitting values or preparing children for economic participation – but also shared public goods, including civic capacities like respect for others and tolerance of difference. It must also protect children’s broader interests, for example, in developing personal autonomy (Brighouse et al., 2018).

The VAT policy does not rest on any claim about the quality or conduct of particular schools. It reflects a general decision to withdraw tax relief from private education and redirect public resources towards the state sector. In How to Think ºÚÁÏÍø911 Religious Schools, however, we take a further step. We argue that, because publicly supported schools should serve children’s interests and wider public goods, all state-funded schools – and thereby any private schools seeking public subsidy (such as via VAT exemption or charitable status) – should be subject to conditions that preserve those goods and interests.

This is not a novel principle. Schools are already subject to many such conditions, including around safeguarding, equality and the promotion of Fundamental British Values. Private schools may be sanctioned or closed if they fail to meet these requirements. In our view, these conditions should include providing a broad and balanced curriculum, adopting a multi-faith and belief approach to religious education (rather than teaching religious beliefs as true), and meeting stronger standards of inclusion and non-discrimination across broader policies and ethos. But you do not need to accept this exact package of conditions to grasp the underlying point: public support for schools is (and must remain) conditional.

The judgments remind us that, when religious organisations seek state recognition or benefit for schools, it is legitimate to ask what kind of education those schools provide: whether they treat all pupils with equal respect, develop a broad range of knowledge and skills, and equip children to engage with wider society, rather than insulating them from it.

This also forces us to confront broader questions about religion, education and public benefit. What obligations should accompany state support? What rights do children have within and with respect to faith schools? And how should a pluralist democracy balance freedom of belief with shared civic values?

The court rulings do not resolve these questions, but they do help to clarify some of the terms on which debates about religious schooling should now proceed, and therefore how educators and policymakers might approach these issues in practice.

References

Brighouse, H., Ladd, H. F., Loeb, S., & Swift, A. (2018). Educational goods: Values, evidence, and decision-making. University of Chicago Press.

Clayton, M., Mason, A., & Swift, A. with Wareham, R. (2024). How to think about religious schools: Principles and policies. Oxford University Press.